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in the principal case recognizes the distinction between the bare receipt
of money or property wholly belonging to another, and the use of
those funds by the recipient resulting in a gain or profit.' 7 The distinction is both logical and practical and is not necessarily inconsistent
with the objective probability of retention test. Although the law is
well settled that a person in a fiduciary position is accountable for
secret profits, the factual variations in which the rule will be applied
does not necessarily make it probable that the fiduciary will be required
8
to pay over all moneys received.
The factual test proposed herein leaves the problem with the Commissioner and the Tax Court'- where on case by case precedent the
rule can be given body and the limits of probability of retention defined.

TAXATION
VALUATION OF FUTURE INTERESTS FOR FEDERAL
TAX PURPOSES
In Estate of Pompeo M. Maresil the Tax Court of the United
States gave what is believed to be first judicial recognition to a
table on the probability of remarriage. 2 The Commissioner refused
petitioner's claim of an estate tax deduction for the present value
of an alimony claim, holding that the interest which ceased with the
wife's possible remarriage was too uncertain to be calculated. The
Tax Court, while recognizing the fallibility of the table offered by
petitioner, held that the deduction should be allowed.3
As recently as 1943 the Supreme Court stated that the taxpayer
is required to present evidence that the contingent interest has a
"present value" in order to overcome the Commissioner's determination
that its value is unascertainable.' Apparently the recognition of the
remarriage table will meet that requirement.

WILLS
CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-PRESUMPTION
UNDUE INFLUENCE

OF

Action was brought to contest a will in which the residuary legatees
47. Principal case at p. 549, and footnote 7 of the opinion citing
National City Bank v. Helvering.
48. 3 C.J.S. §165 (agents); 19 C.J.S. §§786 et. seq. (individual profits
from corporate business); 54 Am. Jur. §§311 et. seq. (trustees).
49. See Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); Paul, "Dobson v.
Comm'r: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," (1944) 57 Har. L.
Rev. 753.
1.
6 T.C. 583 (1946), aff'd, 156 F (2d) 929 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
2. See 19 Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society (May 26,
1933) pp. 291, 298.
3. Principal case at p. 586: "The figures presently relied upon may
leave much to be desired in the way of soundness and accuracy..."
4.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 188 (1943) cf. Humes v.
U.S,. 286 U.S. 487 (1928).
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were the infant sons of the attorney who drafted the instrument. The
lower court set aside the probate of the will. This decision was reversed on the grounds of an erroneous instruction. In anticipation of
questions which would arise upon a new trial, the court said: (1) that
where a confidential relation exists between the testator and a beneficiary, and the beneficiary has been actively concerned with the preparation or execution of the will, the burden of disproving undue influence is cast upon the beneficiary;' (2) that this rule should also
include the situation where the one actively engaged in the preparation
or execution of the will is a member of the immediate family of the
benficiary; and (3) that this rule should apply to testamentary gifts as
well as gifts inter vivos. Sweeney v. Vierbuchen, 66 N.E. (2d) 764
(Ind. 1946).
According to the general rule, in order to raise this presumption,
two circumstances must be present: (1) a confidential relation between
the testator and the beneficiary; (2) participation in the preparation
or execution of the will by the beneficiary. 2 Not all jurisdictions recognize that this state of facts will raise a presumption in the case of
testamentary gifts.s The mere existence of a confidential relation
between the testator and the beneficiary is not sufficient to establish
the presumption. 4 In the absence of participation by the beneficiary
in the preparation or execution of the will, the existence of other facts
is not sufficient to establish a presumption of undue influence. 5 Under
the general rule, the evidence in the principal case would have been
sufficient to establish a presumption of undue influence if the attorney
had been a beneficiary.
The rule has been extended in other jurisdictions to include those
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Contra: Munson v. Quinn, 110 Ind. App. 277, 280, 37 N.E. (2d)
693, 694 (1941) (the so called presumption is in reality an inference).
Willet v. Hall, 220 Ind. 310, 41 N.E. (2d) 619 (1942); Vance v.
Grow, 206 Ind. 614, 190 N.E. 747 (1934); Note (1945) 154 A.LR.
584; see In re Llewellyn's Estate, 296 Pa. 74, 145 Atl. 810, 812
(1929);In re Bucher's Estate, 48 Cal. App. (2d) 465, 120 P. (2d)
44 (1941) (beneficiary secured attorney for testatrix); In re
Smalley's Estate, 124 N.J.Eq. 461, 2 A. (2d) 321 (1938), aff'd,
126 N.J.Eq. 217, 8 A. (2d) 296 (1939) (beneficiary discussed will
with testatrix, and had his attorney prepare the will); In re
Poller's Estate, 204 Wis. 127, 235 N.W. 542 (1931) (payment of
witness to will by beneficiary).
In re Geist's Estate, 325 Pa. 401, 191 Atl. 29 (1937) (in addition
to these facts there must be evidence of mental weakness of the
testator); Ebert v. Ebert, 120 W.Va. 722, 200 S.E. 831 (1939)
(undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will is never presumed
but must be established by proof).
Goodbar v. Lidikey, 136 Ind. 1, 35 N.E. 691 (1893); Notes (1930)
66 A.L.R. 229, (1945) 154 A.L.R. 584.
Beaver v. Emery, 84 Ind. App. 581, 149 N.E. 730 (1925) (acts of
kindness by the beneficiary towards the testator); Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502 (1874) (beneficiary had an opportunity to
exert undue influence); Breadheft v. Cleveland, 184 Ind. 130, 108
N.E. 5 (1915), aff'd, 110 N.E. 662 (failure to leave the estate to
next of kin); In re Kelley's Estate, 150 Ore. 598, 46 P. (2d) 84
(1935) (illicit relations existed between testator and beneficiary).
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situations where a confidential relation existed between the testator
and a person who was actively engaged in the preparation and execution of the will, which person is not himself a beneficiary but is a
member of the immediate family of a beneficiary.6 This extension is
sound. If this extension were not possible, the person with whom the
testator enjoyed a confidential relation might still aid in the preparation and execution of the will, indirectly obtain the benefits of the
will, but obtain them none the less, and still avoid the effect of a
presumption of undue influence which would otherwise be applied.
In those jurisdictions which have refused to apply to testamentary gifts the presumption which has been applied to gifts inter vivos,
the reason given is that when unduly influenced a donor of a gift
inter vivos has been deprived of a beneficial enjoyment of his property,
but a testator has not been similarly deprived of- this benefit since he
is deceased and could not have otherwise enjoyed the benefit of the
property given away.7 This reasoning is not sound. It is equally important that the determination to give and to whom the gift is to be made
should be free from undue influence in the case of testamentary gifts
as in the case of gifts inter vivos. Once the essential facts necessary to
raise a presumption of undue influence are present, the presumption
should be applied with equal force to testamentary gifts as it is
applied to gifts inter vivos.8
6.

7.
8.

Little v. Sugg, 243 Ala. 196, 8 So. (2d) 866 (1942) (mother and
son); Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 N.W. 97 (1900), aff'd,
86 N.W. 959 (1901) (husband and wife); In re Daly's Estate, 59
S.D. 403, 240 N.W. 342 (1932) (attorney and son).
See Folsom v. Buttolph, 82 Ind. App. 283, 308, 143. N.E. 258,
266 (1924); Graham v. Courtwright, 180 Iowa 394, 161 N.W. 774,
777 (1917).
Cf. cases on gifts inter vivos, Olds v. Hitzemann, 220 Ind. 300, 42
N.E. (2d) 35 (1942); Castle v. Kroeger, 111 Ind. App. 43, 39 N.E.
(2d) 459 (1942).

